Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business
Volume 39
Issue 2 Winter
Winter 2019

Investor-State Dispute Settlement in the Digital
Economy: The Case for Structured Proportionality
Robert Ginsburg

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Part of the International Trade Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Robert Ginsburg, Investor-State Dispute Settlement in the Digital Economy: The Case for Structured Proportionality, 39 Nw. J. Int'l L. &
Bus. 171 (2019).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol39/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Copyright 2019 by Robert Ginsburg
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

Vol. 39, No. 2

Investor-State Dispute Settlement in
the Digital Economy: The Case for
Structured Proportionality
Robert Ginsburg1
Abstract: The surge of economic nationalism and cross-border technology
investments foreshadows disputes between inbound investors and host
governments. While cross-border technology transfer is essential for economic
development in many countries, host governments retain the right to safeguard
citizens against potential consequences of such investments. The tension
between these two concepts provides a significant challenge to the future of
foreign direct investment and the global economy. For these reasons, legislators
and arbitrators must develop and enforce regulations that protect public
interests while enabling investors to successfully operate in the host country. In
anticipation of these disputes, this article will explain how arbitral tribunals can
use structured proportionality to accomplish this objective. More specifically,
this article explains the causes of upcoming disputes, introduces a
proportionality analysis of the government’s right to regulate and the degree to
which the investor’s rights are threatened, and demonstrates how the consistent
implementation of a structured proportionality test will maximize the chances
that regulators and arbitrators will find balanced solutions that account for the
interests of all stakeholders of FDI projects.
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The current international investment climate is marked by two major
trends that collide to increase risk exposures for foreign investors in the
digital economy. First, ill-prepared, undefined regulatory frameworks for
innovative technological products and services expose investors to policy
changes that prevent them from implementing their business models.
Second, political shifts toward protectionist policies provide government
officials with the political will to implement such regulations.
When multinational enterprises (MNEs) introduce new products and
services into a sovereign economy where no regulatory framework exists,
legacy local businesses pressure host government officials to put in place
burdensome barriers to entry. These barriers often amount to regulatory
expropriation and investors are forced to file for arbitration. Still,
governments have the right and obligation to regulate investment climates
to protect their citizens from negative impacts of such products and
services.2
Debates about the merits of foreign direct investment projects and the
policies that regulate them often devolve into sweeping conclusions about
cross-border transactions. Such arguments fail to consider case-specific
variables that ultimately determine the net effects of each project. Casespecific details also help arbitrators and regulators identify regulatory
options that safeguard host countries without decimating investors’ business
models.3 Although there is an emerging discourse on regulatory
frameworks for the sharing economy, the literature has not confronted a
critical element: the role of judges and arbitrators in enforcing such
regulations. This article will explore ways in which the decisions of arbitral
tribunals can account for the interests of both parties to technology
disputes.4 Moreover, it will explain how a framework for reviewing arbitral
challenges to regulations can provide an effective bridge to policymakers
whose regulations can prevent the need for contentious proceedings.
When foreign investors challenge a host government’s regulations,
they often pursue claims through investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).
Arbitral reviews and case decisions not only impact the interested parties,
but they also draw a figurative line between acceptable and unacceptable
2
In the context of cross-border expansions in the digital economy, software platforms
threaten privacy and numerous other public interests that government officials are
responsible for regulating. The tension between neo-liberals that support free trade and
investment and anti-globalists who want to protect the absolute sovereignty of host
governments lies at the center of the globalization debate.
3
See generally Benjamin J. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies & Regulatory
Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber? 19 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 293, 295 (2016).
4
A thorough review of multiple databases revealed no hits for searches of articles on
this topic. While there has been a white paper on the topic, the author could not find any that
discuss the topic ISDS and recent innovations in the sharing economy.
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regulations, sending a clear message to regulators and investors in future
projects.5 Based on these considerations, this article will argue that
arbitrators should consistently use the structured proportionality doctrine to
assess investor claims and identify balanced regulations that safeguard the
public and allow investors to generate a profit. In addition to finding the
most equitable outcome, structured proportionality analysis will guide and
encourage legislators and regulators to implement reasonable regulations
that prevent disputes. Utilizing a test that provides consistent, foreseeable
outcomes will also maximize the chances that parties reach a compromise
in the cooling off period.
In anticipation of ISDS cases involving foreign investor technology
claims, this article provides a rubric for resolving regulatory disputes.
Section I explains why there is a significant likelihood for conflicts between
foreign technology investors and host governments. Section II uses case
studies of Airbnb and Uber in new markets to provide anecdotal examples
of overbroad, one-sided regulations that prevent investors from succeeding;
these case studies also show more balanced regulations that provide
investors with a platform to succeed while also safeguarding the public
from negative externalities. Having differentiated acceptable regulations
from those that are overbroad and unacceptable, Section III explains why
ISDS will be the venue for investors to claim that certain regulations breach
the protections under international investment agreements (IIA). Next, the
article identifies the different methods that ISDS tribunals use to analyze
claims of regulatory expropriation and argues that tribunals should
implement proportionality analysis in cross-border technology disputes. In
order to further explain how proportionality analysis will examine treaty
claims, Section IV explains the different forms of balancing and
proportionality that domestic courts and international tribunals use to
examine challenges to regulatory interference. Section V revisits the case
studies to demonstrate how and why structured proportionality analysis
encourages balanced regulations and provides many positive outcomes for
all stakeholders in foreign direct investment projects.
I. CROSS-BORDER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT: THE
IDEOLOGICAL FAULT LINES
The regulation of technology investments is a necessary component of
the new digital economy.6 Innovations are creating services and products
that provide new threats to the environment, consumer safety, and the well5
David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping
Paper for the Investment Policy Community 14 (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv., No.
2012/03, 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en.
6
See generally Stanislaw Drozd, Poland: Investment Disputes in the Era of the Fourth
Industrial Revolution, MONDAQ (Apr. 10, 2018), http://www.mondaq.com/x/690234/
international+trade+investment/Investment+Disputes+In+The+Era+Of+The+Fourth+
Industrial+Revolution; Edelman, supra note 3, at 294-95 n.1.
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being of third parties. For example, Uber’s original process for screening
new drivers was less thorough than those of its counterparts in the taxi
business, who have significant restrictions to ensure safety.7 Similarly,
Airbnb’s platform connects tourists with property owners whose facilities
are not checked with the same level of scrutiny required of hotel owners.8
In both cases, host government regulators need to adopt new regulations
that protect the safety of consumers and third parties. Because government
officials are responsible for regulating a service that has never been
regulated, there is a strong likelihood of conflict between investors and
government officials responsible for protecting the public good.
A. Uncertainty of Regulatory Framework
Regulatory climates are likely to change after technology investors
have entered foreign markets. For example, when Uber penetrated the
Chinese market in 2010, the host government did not have regulations for
ride sharing services; thus, shortly after its arrival in China, the host
government developed and implemented regulations that precluded Uber
from executing an essential component of its business model.9 Soon
thereafter, Uber decided to terminate its multi-billion dollar investment in
China and sold its interests in the platform to a local competitor.10 When
Uber entered the market, such regulations did not exist because Uber was
the seminal investor of this innovation.
B. Highly Regulated Industries
While the uncertainty of regulatory frameworks leaves investors
exposed to new regulations that impede business models, the highly
regulated industries in which they operate leave investors exposed to many
regulations that will impact their investments. In highly regulated
industries, the success of foreign direct investment projects often hinges on
7

Luz Lazo, Cab Companies Unite against Uber and Other Ride-Share Services,
WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/
cab-companies-unite-against-uber-and-other-ride-share-services/2014/08/10/11b23d52-1e3f11e4-82f9-2cd6fa8da5c4_story.html?utm_term=.f373e81f497b.
8
Ally Marotti, Hotel Industry Group Says Airbnb Hosts Running “Illegal Hotels,” CHI.
TRIB. (Mar. 9, 2017) http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-airbnb-hotel-report-0310biz-20170309-story.html; Reity O’Brien, Hotel Industry Targets Upstart Airbnb in
Statehouse Battles, CTR. PUB. INTEGRITY (Jul. 21, 2015), https://www.publicintegrity.
org/2015/07/15/17649/hotel-industry-targets-upstart-airbnb-statehouse-battles; see generally
Erich Eiselt, Airbnb: Innovation and Its Externalities, The Mun. Law. Mag., Nov.-Dec.
2014, at 6.
9
Zheping Huang, China Finally Made Ride-Hailing Legal, in a Way that Could
Destroy Uber’s Business Model, QUARTZ, (July 29, 2016), https://qz.com/745337/chinafinally-made-ride-hailing-legal-in-a-way-that-could-destroy-ubers-business-model/; William
C. Kirby, The Real Reason Uber is Giving Up in China, HARV. BUS. REV., Aug. 2, 2016,
https://hbr.org/2016/08/the-real-reason-uber-is-giving-up-in-china.
10 Id.
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the efficiency of the regulatory frameworks.11 A s a result, incumbent
companies support and work with lobbyists and other government relations
strategists to advocate for favorable policies that are disadvantageous for
companies in the digital arena.12 These ongoing relationships between
regulators and incumbents paired with the uncertainty of frameworks that
threaten foreign investors’ success in the technology sector often cause
problems for foreign investors who are new to the market. These problems
can lead to arbitral disputes between investors and host governments.13
C. Foreign Investors and the Populist Surge
The reemergence of economic nationalism has been a significant
geopolitical development. From Brexit to President Trump’s victory in the
United States, we have seen a geopolitical recession that has reversed
globalization’s tide in the direction of the nation-state and its
municipalities.14 Foreign investors are a common enemy for nationalist host
governments and their constituencies. More specifically, nationalist host
governments blame many of the host country’s economic and social
problems on foreign investors who exploit their labor and resources. For
this reason, the retreat of global forces has compelled sovereign and subsovereign governments to adopt protectionist and overbroad policies that
favor local investors over their foreign competitors.15 While disputes
between foreign investors in the technology sector have not yet reached the
tribunals of investor-state arbitration, it is only a matter of time before they

11
OECD, Main Determinants and Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment on China’s
Economy 14 (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv., No. 2000/04, 2000),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/321677880185; Drozd, supra note 6; Economy Rankings, THE
WORLD BANK: DOING BUSINESS: MEASURING BUSINESS REGULATIONS (Sept. 13, 2018, 7:34
P.M.), http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings.
12 Christopher Elliott, Someone’s Trying to Kill Turo, Airbnb and Uber. Here’s Why It
Matters, FORBES (Oct. 6, 2018, 9:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherelliott/
2018/10/06/someones-trying-to-kill-turo-airbnb-and-uber-heres-why-it-matters/
#235306933745; Aaron Short, The Sharing Economy is New York’s Hottest Political War
Right Now, CITY & STATE N.Y. (May 15, 2018), https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/
policy/policy/sharing-economy-new-yorks-hottest-political-war-right-now.html.
13 Drozd, supra note 6. That said, regulators play an important role in managing market
failures and maximizing the benefits of foreign investments. To find an ideal arbitral
mechanism, it is essential to understand the bona fide regulations and those that are
implemented to protect incumbents against foreign investors.
14 Lazo, supra note 7; Robert Ginsburg, Measuring Trump’s FDI Impact, FDI
INTELLIGENCE (Apr.-May 2017).
15 Christoph Sprich, Growing Protectionism in Foreign Direct Investment, BDI (Apr.
18,
2016)
https://english.bdi.eu/article/news/growing-protectionism-in-foreign-directinvestment/; see, e.g., Mahitha Lingala & Tridivesh Singh Maini, FDI in India on Slippery
Ground? Protectionism, Populism to Blame, QUINT (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.
thequint.com/voices/opinion/foreign-direct-investment-india-trend-protectionism-populism2019-elections.
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do.16
Three components present high-risk exposures for cross-border
technology products: 1) uncertainty about which regulations will be
executed, 2) projects that require significant regulation, and 3) surging
nationalist sentiment. Surging nationalist sentiment fuels anti-investor
sentiment among local competitors which provides the impetus for
regulatory discrimination. The industries that require significant regulatory
activity provide government officials with ample opportunity to execute
regulations that impair foreign investors’ abilities to implement their
business models. Finally, the lack of regulations existing at the time of the
seminal investment makes it difficult for investors to anticipate and adjust
to such discriminatory regulations. These three factors combine to create
significant regulatory risk exposure for foreign investors in the digital
economy.
II. PROTOTYPICAL ASPECTS OF CROSS-BORDER TECHNOLOGY
INVESTMENTS
Software platforms provide significant efficiencies to markets in
which technology companies operate.17 That said, they also threaten public
interests that regulators and other government officials safeguard. Because
of new technology disruptions to host country economies, international
business experts predict many conflicts between foreign investors and the
governments regulating them.18 The challenge for regulators is to harness
the positive aspects of such technology, refrain from implementing
measures that serve to protect industry incumbents and exclude
competitors, and safeguard against the innovation’s threats to public
interest. This requires an understanding of the positive and negative
externalities of such products, the drivers of regulatory conflict, and the
distinction between unfair, protectionist and bona fide, merit-based
regulations.
Airbnb and Uber are pioneers of cross-border investments in the new
digital economy. Airbnb is an online hospitality marketplace for short-term
lodging, and Uber is a global transportation technology company. Both use
platforms to connect service providers and consumers, serving as
illustrative examples of leading innovators in the new digital economy. 19
The case studies below demonstrate the problems these companies have
experienced with regulators in U.S. and foreign cities. While this paper
focuses on cross-border disputes, it uses foreign and domestic case studies
16
Drozd, supra note 6; Gerhard Wegen & Stephan Wilske, Introduction, GETTING THE
DEAL THROUGH, (2018) https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/3/article/29061/arbitration2017-introduction/.
17 Drozd, supra note 6; Edelman, supra note 3, at 296.
18 Drozd, supra note 6; Edelman, supra note 3, at 313
19 Edelman, supra note 3, at 294.
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to provide examples of overbroad and nuanced regulations. The types of
problems in the digital economy are universal.
A. Positive Aspects
The benefits of innovative products and services in the digital
economy focus on resource efficiency, enhanced access to information for
buyers and sellers, and increased accountability for service providers and
consumers.20 These benefits should be protected, rather than threatened, by
regulations.
1. Reducing Transaction Costs
Modern software platforms minimize the costs and simplify the
process associated with finding a suitable transaction counterpart. For
example, rather than having to find a taxi driver who is available and
willing to take the fare, Uber’s transportation platforms provide the public
with access to available drivers who are in close proximity to passengers.
21
More specifically, the application enables Uber passengers “to hail a car
from any location and have it arrive within minutes.”22
2. Reputation and Safety
Many digital platforms also offer important information to service
providers and their clients about each other. For example, if a passenger is
rude or unhygienic or a tenant damages property, platforms can issue a
warning to alert future service providers or even disable the customer’s
account. Conversely, passengers can read reviews of their drivers from
previous passengers. With a mechanism to hold consumers and service
providers accountable to each other, digital platforms encourage actors to
behave appropriately and expose those who do not.23
3. Pricing Efficiencies
By providing current information that is frequently updated to reflect
market conditions and by facilitating open communication among all
parties, software platforms help companies set prices that reflect volatile
levels of supply and demand. As a result, these platforms maximize pricing
efficiencies and enable services providers to meet higher demands.24 For
example, in times of significant demand, higher rates ensure sufficient
20

Id. at 296.
Mohamed S. Jalloh, Uber: Advantages and Disadvantages, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 17,
2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/110614/taxi-industry-pros-consuber-and-other-ehail-apps.asp.
22 Id.
23 Edelman, supra note 3, at 296
24 Id. at 301.
21

178

Investor-State Dispute Settlement
39:171 (2019)

supply by encouraging drivers to work instead of pursuing other activities.
While the benefits of technology transfer have been chronicled for
years, digital platforms and related innovations provide new advantages to
economies. The three benefits explained above are merely a sample of these
new enhancements. 25 For these reasons, legislators and judicial branches of
governments are encouraged to develop and enforce regulations that
harness these innovations.
B. The Regulatory Debate: Protectionist vs. Bona Fide and Protectionist
Regulations
The conflict between governments and investors in the digital
economy mirrors the competing interests in ISDS cases. More specifically,
these conflicts place those who advocate for investor’ property rights
against those who support a host government’s right to regulate. In the
context of ISDS, foreign investors usually argue that regulations violate the
host government’s commitments under international investment treaties.26
Conversely, host governments argue that restrictions on their rights to
regulate violate the sovereignty of nations.27 A review of domestic and
international investment projects between digital investors and host
governments reveals that some regulations are narrowly tailored and meritbased measures that protect the host country from potential consequences of
the technology.28 However, in other cases, the challenged regulations can be
overbroad and often serve to protect the interest of local competitors who
are losing business to foreign investors.29
1. Bona Fide Regulations
Host governments often play a critical role in devising regulations that
maximize the public good associated with different aspects of technology.
25

Id.
Regulation: New Orleans Area, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/neworleans/resources/nola-regulation/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2019); Vehicle Requirements: San
Francisco Bay Area, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/san-francisco/vehicle-requirements/
(last visited Apr. 21, 2019).
27 Nasser Mehsin Al-Adba, The Limitation of State Sovereignty in Hosting Foreign
Investments and the Role of Investor-State Arbitation to Rebalance the Investment
Relationship (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Manchester),
https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/files/54553070/FULL_TEXT.PDF.
28 Edelman, supra note 3 at 313; see Digital Disruption and the Sharing Economy,
DIGITAL
FINANCE
ANALYTICS
BLOG
(Sept.
13,
2018,
7:54
P.M.),
http://digitalfinanceanalytics.com/blog/category/sharing-economy/ (outlining regulations
applicable to Uber).
29 See Growing Protectionism in Foreign Direct Investment, BDI (Sept. 13, 2018, 7:58
P.M.),
https://english.bdi.eu/article/news/growing-protectionism-in-foreign-directinvestment/; Edelman, supra note 3 at 307. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies, The
Rise of Digital Protectionism: Insights from a CFR Workshop, COUNCIL FOR. REL. (Sept. 13,
2018, 7:57 P.M.), https://www.cfr.org/report/rise-digital-protectionism.
26
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One of the most important regulatory objectives in the digital economy is to
remedy market failures.30 Market failures are some set of interactions and
relationships that prevent market transactions from adequately serving the
interests of everyone concerned.31 Regulations are necessary for correcting
market failures and promoting public policy interests and should be upheld.
In the context of Uber, government officials are ostensibly interested in
regulating safety concerns related to the condition of the automobile and the
skills of the driver.32 In order to minimize problems associated with these
issues, many governments require drivers to undergo extensive background
checks and require that every vehicle undergo inspections to ensure that it is
structurally sound. These regulations, which also apply to taxi drivers, are
reasonable because they are tailored to meet a specific policy interest. For
these reasons, they are not protectionist.
2. Protectionist Regulations
While many regulations help protect consumers and the public from
the potential negative impact of business activity, others are often
implemented to protect industry incumbents from competition of new
entrants to the market. These regulations often benefit the regulated firms
more than the consumers for whom the restrictions are supposed to be
implemented. Regulators often become closely linked to the firms they
regulate, through extended interactions, parallel career trajectories, or
mutual desires to maintain the status quo.33 In some cases, the influence of
companies in a regulated sector is powerful enough to provide a situation in
which the regulator is the entity that is being regulated. In such cases,
regulations are more likely to be overbroad and/or implemented to favor
local investors over foreign competitors.34
C. Case Studies; Uber and Airbnb
After experiencing initial rounds of success in their cross-border
expansions, Airbnb and Uber ran into significant roadblocks. Complaints
from hotel owners and taxi drivers whose margins were falling and other
constituents who were upset about surging rental prices and excessive
congestion compelled government officials to take action.35 While
30 Market failures are “some set of interactions and relationships that prevent market
transactions from adequately serving the interests of everyone concerned.” Each innovation
brings different externalities to the industry or local economy that regulators must address.
Edelman, supra note 3 at 309.
31 See Edelman, supra note 3 at 309.
32
Adrienne Roberts, Uber Crash Highlights Growing Safety Concerns: Pedestrians,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-crash-highlights-growingsafety-concern-pedestrians-1521810000.
33 Id.
34 Edelman, supra note 3 at 307.
35 Marotti, supra note 8; Airbnb’s Legal Troubles: What Are the Issues?, THE
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regulators in cities such as Barcelona and Berlin implemented policies that
actively discouraged homeowners from renting their homes, regulators in
Asia and Europe implemented policies that interfered with Uber’s ability to
launch operations and compete with local taxi companies.36 Conversely,
there are other examples in which regulators developed policies that were
tailored to address market failures and promote public policy interests. For
example, in San Francisco and San Diego, authorities implemented
regulations to stop rent inflation by preventing hosts from posting more
than one listing on Airbnb’s website.37
1. Uber: Nuanced Measures Directed at the Problem vs. Minimizing Usage
or Protectionism
The ostensible objectives of host governments that regulate Uber and
its drivers are vehicle safety, driver integrity, and insurance gaps for drivers
who do not have adequate coverage.38 Uber’s experiences in France provide
an example of situations in which host governments pass unreasonable
regulations that are likely implemented for protectionist purposes.39 When
expanding into France, Uber experienced initial success, triggering dissent
from local competitors and demonstrations from non-government
organizations. In response to the demonstrations against the noise problems
and adverse impact on local rental prices, the French Parliament passed a
series of laws known as “Loi Thévenoud.”40 This law imposed regulations
that are not reasonably connected to consumer protection concerns. Loi
Thévenoud precluded “transport vehicles with drivers” (a category
developed for covering transportation platforms, including Uber) “from
being geo-localized by users before reservation.” Under this restriction,
Uber users in France cannot use their smartphones to locate drivers before
making a reservation with a specific driver. In addition to prohibiting
“geolocalization,” the law also prohibits Uber drivers from driving
consecutive passengers without returning to their base in between rides, if
the second passenger has not made a reservation. This causes delays in
GUARDIAN, July 8, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/travel/2014/jul/08/airbnb-legaltroubles-what-are-the-issues/; see also Ambreen Ali, Different Regulatory Tactics Lead to
Success for Sharing Economy Startups Uber, Airbnb, 1776 (Sept. 13, 2018, 8:08 P.M.),
https://www.1776.vc/insights/different-regulatory-tactics-lead-to-success-for-uber-airbnb/.
36 Tracey Lien & David Pierson, Uber is the Latest U.S. Tech Company to Face
Regulatory Backlash in Europe, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.
latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-tech-europe-20171110-story.html.
37 Carolyn Said, Airbnb Loses Thousands of Hosts in SF as Registration Rules Kick in,
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Jan. 14, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/
business/article/Airbnb-loses-thousands-of-hosts-in-SF-as-12496624.php?psid=hBuu.
38 See, e.g., Margaret Bree, New Background Check Regulation Tackles Ride-Sharing
Safety, THE HEIGHTS (Mar. 17, 2016), http://bcheights.com/2016/03/17/new-backgroundcheck-regulation-tackles-ride-sharing-safety/.
39 Edelman, supra note 3 at 306-09.
40 Id. at 306.
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pickup times and can result in the loss of passengers for drivers who are
using resources such as gas and time.
Regulation experts in the digital economy noted that there is not a
meritorious objective in implementing this policy, consequently concluding
that it exists to obstruct ride-sharing companies.41 This regulatory scheme
solely serves to impede drivers’ abilities to be near passengers who are
scattered throughout the city. In fact, passengers of Uber taxis are helped
(rather than harmed) when drivers are drawn to areas of high demand.
When a regulatory framework, such as Loi Thévenoud, complicates the
product’s ability to serve locals and provides no inherent benefit to either
the market or the public, it is likely a protectionist regulation. In fact, in
some cities, government officials openly admit that regulations are
motivated by protectionist objectives.42
Whereas Loi Thevenaou provides an example of regulations that are
not reasonably related to the stated objective, others focus on overbroad
regulations that deter or terminate the consumer’s ability to use software
platforms. 43 Alternatively, regulators in Australia and Washington, D.C.
chose to address insurance gaps with tailored regulations. Rather than
banishing Uber in certain areas, Australian regulators sought to eliminate
insurance gaps with legislation that prevents non-commercial insurance
policies from paying claims from transportation activity associated with
Uber’s digital platform.44 Regulators in Washington D.C. addressed safety
concerns by requiring Uber drivers to undergo thorough background checks
that include ongoing communication between the digital platform’s staff

41

Id. at 307.
See, e.g., Marcin Goclowski, Poland May Impose More Regulations on Uber,
REUTERS (June 14, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/uber-poland-regulations/polandmay-impose-more-regulations-on-uber-idUSL8N1JB1N1 (noting “[t]he judge issued the
ban, the equivalent of a temporary injunction, on the grounds that Uber was deemed to be
causing damage to the taxi industry”); Al Goodman, Spanish Judge Imposes Temporary Ban
on Uber Taxi Service, CNN (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.cnn.com/2014/12/09/world/
europe/spain-uber-court-ban/index.html (explaining that ban was imposed because Uber was
causing damage to the taxi industry).
43 Associated Press, Uber Seeks Legal Advice After New South Wales Suspends
Registration of 40 Cars, GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/sep/28/uber-seeks-legal-advice-after-40-new-south-wales-driverssuspended; Greg Dickinson, How the World is Going to War with Uber, TELEGRAPH (June
26, 2018), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/news/where-is-uber-banned/.
44 Rideshare
Insurance Requirements, UBER (Sept. 13, 2018, 8:14 P.M.),
https://www.uber.com/en-AU/drive/insurance/ (outlining regulations for Australian drivers).
The gaps in insurance were caused (in part) by the drivers’ expectations that their
noncommercial liability coverage would respond to Uber related claims. By disallowing the
motivated driver to purchase commercial coverage that does not respond. Roberts, supra
note 32; Matt Rogers, Uber and Suffocating Government Regulations, INT’L POLICY DIGEST
(Sept. 23, 2017), https://intpolicydigest.org/2017/09/23/uber-and-suffocating-governmentregulations/.
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and the FBI.45Unlike the regulations in Loi Thevenaou, these regulations
serve a clear purpose. By performing background checks, authorities are
screening potential drivers without preventing those with clean records
from driving. Regulators in Washington D.C. and Australia implemented
more tailored regulations that address related concerns without a significant
intrusion into the investor’s property rights. Ultimately, these regulations
allow the public to benefits from the positive aspects of the innovation
while minimizing the impact of the negative aspects.
2. Airbnb: Nuanced Measures vs. Minimizing Usage with Blunt Tools
In the context of Airbnb, regulators’ ostensible objectives are to reduce
traffic in and out of rented units, reduce inflated residential and commercial
rental rates due to increased housing demand, and address housing
shortages for residents who cannot compete with the prices speculators are
willing to pay.46
(a) Fort Worth
Several cities in the United States have mitigated their exposure to
Airbnb-related problems by providing stringent regulations for homeowners
who want to use the site for additional income. Through these stringent
measures, host cities mitigate the problems by significantly reducing the
number of hosts who use them. For example, in Fort Worth, Texas
regulators require potential Airbnb hosts to apply for a bed and breakfast
exception to the rule that prohibits short-term rentals for under 30 days in
residential areas. 47 .48 Bed and breakfasts are commercial entities subject to
a number of stricter regulatory requirements with which residential entities
need not comply.49 Therefore, Airbnb applicants in Fort Worth must make
sure that their rental properties have standard commercial safety equipment
45 Faiz Siddiqui, Uber Threatens to Pull Out of Maryland if State Requires FingerprintBased Background Checks, WASH. POST, (Dec. 3, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/trafficandcommuting/uber-is-threatening-to-leave-maryland-if-state-toughens-driverscreening-rules/2016/12/03/1080b1b2-b02c-11e6-be1c-8cec35b1ad25_story.html?utm_term
=.683eaacf6ca6.
46 Gaby Hinsliff, Airbnb and the So-Called Sharing Economy is Hollowing Out Our
Cities, GUARDIAN (Aug 31, 2018, 3:06 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2018/aug/31/airbnb-sharing-economy-cities-barcelona-inequality-locals;
What Regulations Apply to My City?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/961/
what-regulations-apply-to-my-city (last visited Apr. 21, 2019).
47 https://www.star-telegram.com/news/local/community/arlington/article210174114.
html
48
Id.
49 See Fort Worth Ordinance 21653. The ordinance says, in making a determination if a
property is being used as a short-term home rental, the definition for “transient or short-term
resident” is reviewed and if the duration of the stay is less than 30 days, that use is not
allowed since it is more analogous to a bed or breakfast home which is allowed in a twofamily zoning district by special exception.
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and that they meet specific structural and parking requirements.50 These
regulations—including door widths, safety stairs, sprinkler systems, and
access points—often require homeowners to make structural adjustments to
their homes if they want to rent their homes out on Airbnb.51 Other
regulations include onerous parking regulations and staffing requirements:
Fort Worth’s hosts must provide a parking space for every guest who stays
in the home.52 Hosts who have multiple guests and live in an urban areas
(including Fort Worth) are unable to meet this requirement and,
consequently, cannot host through Airbnb. For hosts who want to rent out
their homes for supplemental income, the financial and time investments
required to rent out their homes outweigh the potential benefits.
Conversely, traditional bed and breakfast owners and hotels, whose primary
incomes come from housing guests, are more than happy to comply with
such regulations. With less incentive to register with Airbnb, the supply of
available rental units diminishes, and consequently, so do the financial,
noise, and pollution problems that cities need to regulate. While these broad
regulations are effective at mitigating the negative consequences, they
provide a very significant intrusion on the property rights of potential hosts
who are discourage from using the platform. In sharp contrast to the
regulators in Fort Worth, San Francisco has developed tailored regulations
for managing problems associated with home sharing.53
(b) San Francisco
City officials in San Francisco have spent a significant amount of time
listening to complaints from city residents about Airbnb’s negative impact
on the local real estate market. The surge in rental prices and the related
shortage of available housing is a direct result of the real estate investors
buying properties as investments and renting them out to visitors.54
Speculators who buy and rent their homes as hotels are buying many of the
50 Id. Chapter 5.106 is the bed and breakfast home regulation, which also refers to
additional requirements of Chapter 4, Articles 6 and 8 of the city’s zoning ordinance.
http://fortworthtexas.gov/planninganddevelopment/zoning/ordinance/5_100.pdf?v=2016-0520
51 These requirements can be found in Chapter 4, Article 6 of Fort Worth’s Zoning
Ordinance.
52 Id.
53 There are myriad examples of cities using problem-specific measures to regulate
Airbnb. See, e.g., Leonard Cohen, Airbnb and Municipal Zoning Regulation, HOST
COMPLIANCE (Sept. 13, 2018 9:12 P.M.), https://hostcompliance.com/resources-gallery/
2016/6/5/airbnbregulation (discussing how, in order to mitigate the financial problems
associated with Airbnb, the city council voted to legalize home-sharing services and
partnered with Airbnb to launch its Shared City Initiative, which has agreed to help Airbnb
renters collect taxes on behalf of the city).
54 Sarah Holder, The Airbnb Effect: It’s Not Just Rising Home Prices, CITYLAB (Feb. 1,
2019), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/02/study-airbnb-cities-rising-home-prices-tax/
581590/.
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available units without any intention of living in them.55 Consequently, this
boost in demand is driving the price of real estate up. Unlike Fort Worth,
San Francisco sought to deal with problem head-on without relying on
antiquated policies that discourage overall usage. In order to deal with the
rent scarcity problem, San Francisco developed two nuanced rules for
short-term rentals. First, the city implemented a rule that struck at the core
of the speculator’s business model. In order to rent their homes to visitors,
the homeowner must live in the unit (home or apartment) for at least 275
days per year.56 This requirement aims directly at the business model of
speculators. With this rule in place, real estate entrepreneurs cannot
purchase multiple facilities and rent them out without residing in them for a
significant amount of time. Rather, they can only rent out the one facility in
which they reside for the minimum number of days. Eager to close any
loopholes, regulators in San Francisco implemented a 90-day rule, which
limits the total number of days that a host can rent out his/her place without
actually being present in the house.57 Real estate entrepreneurs seeking to
make significant amounts of money through Airbnb will be discouraged
from buying multiple homes if they can only rent out those homes for onequarter of the year. Violators who continue to rent out their apartments
beyond the 90 days are subject to significant fines. While San Francisco
developed significant regulations for Airbnb users, its tailored framework
stands in sharp contrast to the onerous and overbroad regulations of Fort
Worth. In fact, hostcompliance.com, an independent consultancy that helps
governments with short-term rental policies, praised San Francisco’s highly
regulated, but workable, framework. According to hostcompliance.com,
“San Francisco should serve as a model for the way municipalities think
about Airbnb.”58
(c) San Diego
A review of independent reports and expert commentary reveals that
San Diego’s regulators and residents favor compromises rather than
endorsing extreme policies that either ban Airbnb or allow it to operate
without restrictions.59 In 2016, R Street, a think tank in Washington, D.C.,
issued a report ranking different cities’ Airbnb regulations according to the
55 Curtis Hearn, How to Invest in AirBnB Property (with Investment Calculator), SMART
MONEY NATION (Mar. 7, 2018), https://smartmoneynation.com/invest-airbnb-property/.
56 Stephen Fishman, Overview of Airbnb Law in San Francisco, NOLO
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/overview-airbnb-law-san-francisco.html.
57 Id.
58
Cohen, supra note 53.
59 Andrew Moylan, Roomscore 2016 Short-term Rental Regulation in US Cities, R
STREET 12 (Mar. 2016), https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSTREET55.
pdf; Steven Greenhut, San Diego Council Chief trying to quickly push through Airbnb ban R
STREET (November 2016), https://www.rstreet.org/2016/11/01/san-diego-council-chieftrying-to-quickly-push-through-airbnb-ban.
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user-friendliness of their policies. Citing user-friendly regulations such as
those that allow speculators to own and rent multiple homes, R Street gave
the highest possible grade of “A” to San Diego.60 However, complaints
from residents and hotel owners compelled policy makers to shift the
regulatory needle toward more restrictive policies.61 While the debate over
the proper remedies ensued, politicians and residents alike agreed that
regulatory compromises were the best solution.62 These new rules
addressed the problems of scarcity in home supply and inflated rent by
limiting the number of units that lessors can rent to one.63 Although the new
regulations are more stringent than preexisting policies, they are tailored to
rent inflation and to specific geographical areas that experience scarcity in
available homes. More specifically, additional requirements are placed on
lessors who aim to list properties that are located in both more popular
coastal areas and in the downtown area.64 By reserving this stringent
measure for areas that have the most serious problems, the Council
refrained from endorsing blanket policies that ignore geographic
differences. This helps regulators manage the problem without
unnecessarily restricting hosts in areas where the problems are less
pronounced.
III. DIFFERENT TESTS FOR REVIEWING REGULATORY
CHALLENGES AND WHY FET IS BEST
Many of the conflicts arising out of the regulations of cross-border
digital investment will focus on disagreements between foreign investors
and host governments. In cases where the host state has entered into a
bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with the home country, inbound investors
will have a direct cause of action against the host government. For this
reason, many of the formal disputes between these parties will take place in
investor-state arbitral tribunals. In promising to provide certain protections
(including fair and equitable treatment) to investors from the home country,
the parties to the investment treaties consent to arbitrations when conflicts
cannot be resolved amicably.65
60

Id. at 10.
Lori Weisberg & Rob Nikolewski, San Diego council votes to limit Airbnb rentals to
primary residences only, The San Diego Union-Tribune (Jul. 16, 2018),
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/tourism/sd-fi-airbnb-council-20180715story.html.
62 Greenhut, supra note 59.
63 Lori Weisberg & Rob Nikolewski, San Diego council votes to limit Airbnb rentals to
primary residences only, The San Diego Union-Tribune (Jul. 16, 2018), https://www.
sandiegouniontribune.com/business/tourism/sd-fi-airbnb-council-20180715-story.html.
64 Additional requirement prevents users from renting out their apartments to guests
who stay two nights or less; Jennifer Sokolowsky, San Diego City Council Approves Strict
New Airbnb Rules (July 2018), https://www.avalara.com/mylodgetax/en/blog/2018/07/sandiego-city-council-approves-strict-new-airbnb-rules.html.
65 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Dispute Settlement: International
61
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A. Bilateral Investment Treaties and Investor-State Arbitration
BITs comprise two kinds of protections: general protections that
promise certain standards of treatment and specific protections, where
governments promise not to implement certain types of measures that
impact foreign investors from the home country.66The substantive
protections include promises to adhere to the national treatment and most
favored national standards, in addition to requiring payment of
compensation for expropriation and measures “tantamount to
expropriation.”67
General protections provide foreign investors with guarantees to
adhere to basic standards of treatment. The most fundamental principle of
non-discrimination, which is comprised of the most-favored nation
principle (MFN) and national treatment (NT) principle, forms the basis of
treaty provisions that speak to discriminatory regulations.68 MFN stipulates
that a signatory country to a BIT should receive the same benefits as
investors from the home country.69 Similarly, NT states that non-nationals
should be treated no worse than nationals. Protections include measures
against specific actions including the inability to convert and transfer funds
as well as the nationalization of foreign investments. While these provisions
of international investment treaties are specifically designed to distinguish
between protectionist and merit-based regulations, there is a significant
limitation to their applicability.70 In order to bring a claim of discrimination
under a BIT, the claimant must identify investments that were made in like
circumstances. Although in some cases the issue of likeness is simple, it is
often more difficult to meet this requirement. In the case of cross-border
technology investments, the investor is often the innovator of the product or
services and consequently, could not satisfy this jurisdictional requirement.
B. Fair and Equitable Treatment and Relative Protections
While regulations can be challenged under the specific and general
protections of international investment treaties, the broadest and most
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, U.N. CTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.2 (2003); Cf.
WALLACE DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION219-246. (Oxford University Press,
2008).
66 Brenna Evans, Najia Mahmud, & Robert Ginsburg, Investor-State Dispute Settlement:
What Canadian Practitioners Need to Know, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION 229
(Todd Archibald ed., 2018) (whereas the home country is the county in which the foreign
investor resides, the host country is a country in which the actual investment takes place);
https://forum.wordreference.com/threads/host-country-and-home-country.1972361/.
67
OECD, “Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International
Investment Law 44 (Org. Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Working Paper No. 2004/04, 2004);
Dugan, supra note 65, at 442–43, 450–51.
68 See Dugan, supra note 65, at 397
69 See id. at 414.
70 See Dugan, supra note 65, at 413

187

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

39:171 (2019)

common challenges to government measures are filed under the Fair and
Equitable Treatment clause (FET).71 Claimants use the FET standard as
their primary mechanism for challenging government measures that
negatively impact their investments.72 Arbitrators use the standard as a
multi-purpose umbrella principle that allows them to invoke and apply a
wealth of sub-principles. The broad scope of the FET enables tribunals to
consider a wider range of factors than is possible under the relevant test for
direct and indirect expropriations. The analyses of many FET claims focus
on investor perspectives of the host governments’ actions. Examples of a
sub-principles FET analysis include, but are not limited to: good faith;
access to justice and due process; regulatory transparency; nonarbitrariness; nondiscrimination and reasonableness; and the investor’s
legitimate expectations.73
Unlike MFN and NT clauses that focus exclusively on a comparative
analysis of host governments’ treatment of investors, the FET clause
sometimes allows consideration of conflicting interests between investors’
property rights and host governments’ rights to regulate. Arbitrators who
focus on the collision of investor property rights with a host government’s
right to regulate investment climate use a proportionality principle to
determine which principle should prevail in cases arising from international
investment treaties.
C. Legitimate Expectations: The Investor’s Perspective
One of the most common principles invoked under the FET standard is
that of legitimate expectations.74 The FET standard is violated when the
investor is deprived of its legitimate expectation.75 Many assessments of an
investor’s legitimate expectations examine the facts of a case through the
claimant’s lens at the time of the investment and, consequently, use an
absolute perspective to determine outcomes.76 In the 2004 Occidental v.
Ecuador award, the tribunal stated, “there is certainly an obligation not to
alter the legal and business environment in which the investment has been
made.”77 Three years later, the tribunal in Parkerings v. Lithuania stated,
71

Dugan, supra note 65, at 493.
Matthew C. Porterfield, A Distinction Without a Difference? The Interpretation of
Fair and Equitable Treatment Under Customary International Law by Investment Tribunals,
Investment Treaty News (Mar. 22, 2013), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2013/03/22/a-distinctionwithout-a-difference-the-interpretation-of-fair-and-equitable-treatment-under-customaryinternational-law-by-investment-tribunals/.
73 Dugan, supra note 65, at 491-540.
74
Fair and Equitable Treatment, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT 10 (2012), https://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf.
75 Id. at 63.
76 Id. at 65-66.
77 GEBHARD BUCHELER, PROPORTIONALITY IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 200 (1st
ed., 2015).
72
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“[t]he Fair and Equitable Treatment standard is violated when the investor
is deprived of its legitimate expectation that the conditions existing at the
time of the agreement would remain unchanged.” 78 By focusing on the
reasonableness of an investor’s expectations, the scope of the examination
implies that legislative changes that go against an investor’s reasonable
expectations will lead to liability under the FET provision.
D. Proportionality and the Collision of Principles
While some tribunals focus on the investor’s perspective, a minority of
tribunals do not consider the FET standard to be absolute. According to
Francesco Francioni, “a progressive interpretation of the ‘fair and equitable
standard...’ entails that the investor who seeks equity for his investment’s
protection must also be accountable, under equity and fairness principles, to
the host state’s population affected by the investment.”79 As early as 2006,
the Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic tribunal’s interpretation
of the fair and equitable treatment standard stated that the host
government’s interest should be considered as well.80 In Saluka, the tribunal
determined:
In order to determine whether frustration of the foreign investor’s
expectations was justified and reasonable, the host State’s legitimate
right subsequently to regulate domestic matters in the public interest
must be taken into consideration as well...[t]he determination of a
breach of Article 3.1 by the Czech Republic therefore requires a
weighing of the Claimant’s legitimate and reasonable expectations
on one hand and the Respondent’s legitimate regulatory interests on
the other.81

Multiple tribunals have reinforced the notion that proportionality
should be used to review FET claims.82 In 2010, the Lemire tribunal
elaborated on the concept of balancing the interests of multiple
stakeholders.83 More specifically, it stated that the Fair and Equitable
Treatment analysis should consider: the State’s sovereign right to pass
legislation and to adopt decisions for the protection of public interests,
especially if they do not provoke a disproportionate impact on foreign
investors, legitimate expectations of the investor, at the time he made his
78

Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8,
Award, ¶ 330 (Sept. 11, 2007).
79 Alex Stone Sweet, Investor-state Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 J. L.
& ETHICS HUM. RIGHTS 48, 62 (2010).
80
Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, UNCTRAL-PCA Case, ¶ 304-06
(Mar. 17, 2006).
81 Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, UNCTRAL-PCA Case, ¶ 304-06
(Mar. 17, 2006).
82 See generally, Bucheler, supra note 77, at 193.
83 Id.
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investment, the investor’s duty to perform an investigation before effecting
the investment, and the investor’s conduct in the host country.84
Proportionality is a legal doctrine that is perfectly suited for reconciling
conflicting interests on a case-by-case basis. In addition to citing case law,
arbitrators have opined that FET state action must be proportionate.85 Using
the proportionality test to review the collision of principles with rights on a
case-by-case basis, arbitral panels can ensure that the “detriment to one of
the values involved is no greater than factually and legally necessary for the
purposes of the other.”86
E. Proportionality with a Caveat
The enhanced benefits of imminent disputes between foreign investors
in the digital economy require alternative approaches to reviewing
challenges to regulations. As mentioned above, software platforms enhance
pricing efficiencies, lower transaction costs, and enhance safety related to
services and products by encouraging and requiring transparency and
accountability.87 Conventional proportionality reviews weigh the host
country’s need for regulations against the degree with which it interferes
with an investor’s rights.88 The enhanced benefits of technological
innovation merit a new approach, rather than an exclusive focus on the
negative externalities of inbound investments More specifically, arbitral
tribunals should account for the positive impacts of such investments when
arbitral claims demonstrate that relevant regulations threaten to eliminate
them.
IV. BALANCING AND PROPORTIONALITY: BASICS OF
STRUCTURED PROPORTIONALITY
While there are many ways to apply the FET standard in ISDS cases,
there are also multiple forms of proportionality. A review of proportionality
jurisprudence in different parts of the world reveals that different countries
implement different forms of proportionality analysis in the context of
constitutional disputes.89 The primary distinction between these approaches
is reflected in the way that arbitrators weigh the government’s intrusion
upon the right against the public good that it aims to accomplish.
84 Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Int’l Investment
Agreement, ¶ 285 (Jan. 14, 2010); see also Bucheler, supra note 77, at 200.
85 Other arguments in favor of using proportionality analysis to review FET claims
integrate the Vienna Convention. More specifically, scholars and arbitrators have argued that
the ordinary meaning of fair and equitable is “just, even-handed treatment.”
86
Robert Alexy, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 102 (Oxford University Press,
2002).
87 Edelman, supra note 3, at 296
88 Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J.
3094, 3099 (2015)
89 See Bucheler, supra note 77, at 67-68; see also, Sweet, supra note 79, at 49.
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Specifically, countries including the United States and South Africa follow
an approach that considers multiple factors and strikes a balance that courts
use differently from case to case.90 In other nations that employ a structured
proportionality test, courts implement a more rigid, sequenced examination
that applies each step of the test in the original order.91 While there are
minor differences between each country’s implementation of structured
proportionality tests, they all follow a similar path.
A. An Overview of Structured Proportionality
Structured proportionality is a doctrine that comprises a trigger clause
and three additional steps to determine the constitutionality of a given
measure.92 First, the court examines whether the law’s objective is
legitimate, and whether to trigger the subsequent scrutiny into the
constitutionality of the government measure. Under structured
proportionality analysis, the process of reviewing the law’s objective
(hereafter the “trigger clause”) serves as the gateway to a three-step inquiry
focused on the relationship between the means and ends of the legislation
and the degree of the intrusion on the relevant right.
Canadian courts provide a great example of structured proportionality
review. Canada’s version of the trigger clause first examines whether an
investor’s right is being infringed. If an infringement of interests protected
by a right occurs, then the constitutionality of the means used is examined
through a three-step inquiry into: (a) rationality, (b) minimal impairment,
and (c) proportionality “as such.”93 Whereas the first two steps of this test
focus on means-ends analysis, the third step provides a comparison of the
marginal improvement between two regulations and the marginal intrusion
of the investor’s rights between them.94
1. Rationality
While jurisdictions may use different forms of the rationality clause,
all examine the relationship between means and ends. As opposed to the
trigger clause, which focuses on the merits of the government objective,
this step focuses on the means chosen to meet the government objective.
During this element of the analysis, the courts identify and often reject
means that are overly broad or not reasonably related to the ends. While the
implementation of this step varies, most measures that satisfy the trigger
clause also pass the rationality analysis.95
90

See Bucheler, supra note 77, at 45.
Jackson, supra note 88, at 3113.
92 Id.
93 Id.; see Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 57 UNIV. TORONTO J. 383, 387 (2007).
94 See Jackson, supra note 88, at 3099; see Grimm, supra note 93, at 393.
95 Jackson, supra note 88, at 3113; Grimm, supra note 93, at 387.
91
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2. Minimal Impairment
The minimal impairment step focuses on the balance of the
alternatives for meeting the government interest. In practice, courts look to
see if there are less restrictive alternatives that can achieve the same
government objective as the challenged measure.96 If the claimant cannot
demonstrate that the less restrictive alternative equally advances the law’s
purpose, the challenged measures will remain in place. Consequently, many
alternatives that effectively protect the public good (but not as effectively as
the original) and provide less intrusive options regarding the claimant’s
rights are not sufficient to overturn the challenged measure.
3. Proportionality “As Such”
Proportionality “as such” is part of a doctrine that prioritizes the right
of the investor and the extent to which the right is being intruded upon,
putting the burden of justification on the government. Unlike the first two
steps (rationality and minimal impairment) that focus exclusively on the
means-ends analysis, this step requires a direct comparison between the
severity of the government measure and the extent to which the measure
infringes on the investor’s rights.97 The proportionality “as such” step
compares the need for the challenged measure and its effectiveness with the
extent to which the investor’s right is infringed.98 For this reason,
government measures that pass the rationality and minimal impairment
steps often fail to satisfy the proportionality “as such” step. Although less
formal versions of proportionality provide more latitude to decision makers
about the form of analysis, the strict footprint of structured proportionality
ensures that arbitrators and judges will follow the same line of inquiry.
B. Alternatives to Structured Proportionality
Unlike the jurisdictions mentioned above, the principle of
proportionality is not firmly established in U.S. jurisprudence. That said,
several concepts in U.S. constitutional law perform a de facto examination
of factors similar to those balanced in South African courts.99 U.S. courts
balance and weigh factors in many contexts, including the dormant
commerce clause and cases concerning the First Amendment. Like the
minimal impairment analysis, U.S. jurisprudence often uses a “less
restrictive means” analysis to determine whether the government measure
was sufficiently tailored to its purpose.100 The result is that judges look to
96

Jackson, supra note 88, at 3114; Grimm, supra note 93, at 387.
Jackson, supra note 88, at 3116-17; Grimm, supra note 93, at 389.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 3100.
100 “U.S. case law on ‘less restrictive means’ sometimes obscures the distinction between
‘less restrictive means’ that are as effective and those that are not in part because of the
absence of any separate analysis of ‘proportionality as such.’” Jackson, supra note 88, at
97
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see if there is a net impact favoring the plaintiff or the government.
In countries, like South Africa, where courts implement a multifactor
analysis, the factors are not individual, ordered steps; instead, they are part
of an overall balancing exercise that the courts use to determine an
outcome.101 While the factors provide guidance to judges who can often
select which factors on which to focus, judges in countries that use
structured proportionality are required to consider every factor in a specific
order.102 The accountability brought by a rigid and comprehensive
proportionality test ensures that all factors that need to be considered are
included in the judicial analysis.
C. Why Structured Proportionality is the Best Option
The following section explains how the third step of the
constitutionality analysis often produces different outcomes from balancing
and multifactor tests that do not incorporate this step. Next, it provides two
reasons why this should be applied in technology disputes under ISDS.
1. The Proportionality “As Such” Step: The Difference Maker
Only through this step does the court take full account of the severity
of deleterious effects of a measure on individuals or groups. 103 The real
consideration is how deeply the right is infringed. Other considerations
include: the seriousness of the danger that the law is preventing and the
likelihood that the danger will materialize.
By going beyond rationality and minimal impairment, the
proportionality “as such” test can make the doctrine more rigorous than
strict U.S. scrutiny or any interpretation of the multi-factor test, which ends
after the least restrictive means test. In the seminal Canadian dispute
involving structured proportionality, Chief Justice Dickson explained that:
Even if an objective is of sufficient importance, and the first two
elements of the proportionality test are satisfied, it is still possible
that, because of the severity of the deleterious effects of a measure
on individuals or groups, the measure will not be justified by the
purposes it is intended to serve. The more severe the deleterious
effects of a measure, the more important the objective must be if the
measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.104

By including the

“as

such”

proportionality test,

structured

3118. In fact, U.S. courts tend not to specify whether this analysis requires that the measures
being compared “equally advance” the compelling government interest.
101 Jackson, supra note 88, at 3099-3100.
102 Jackson, supra note 88, at 3120.
103 Jackson, supra note 88, at 3116-17.
104 Id.
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proportionality will maximize the chances of finding an alternative that
protects the public good without precluding its success and provide a better
bridge and judicial check against legislation.
2. Structured Proportionality: Maximizing Chances of Finding Balanced
Alternative
The Beit Sourik Village Council vs. Government of Israel dispute
from the Israeli courts illustrates an example in which the third step of
structured proportionality provides a different outcome from that which is
provided by less formal tests without the third step. In cases such as the
Beit Sourik case, structured proportionality provides more reasonable
outcomes than those that are reviewed without the third step.
A dispute between the state of Israel and Beit Sourik demonstrates
how the proportionality “as such” clause provides outcomes based on
compromise.105 This case, which focuses on the conflict between the
security of Israelis in occupied territories and Palestinian access to
farmland, appeared in front of the Israeli High Court of Justice. While this
case focuses on international humanitarian law, it demonstrates how a
rigorous application of the “as such” step provides balanced solutions that
protect the public good and respect landowners’ and foreign investors’
rights.
In 2005, Israel’s government withdrew from most of its settlements in
the Gaza Strip. Still, Israel maintained some of its settlements in the West
Bank that were expanded and controlled under military rule. Seven years
later, Israel began building a large wall, or separation fence, along the West
Bank that was intended to separate Israel’s West Bank settlements from the
rest of the territory.106 While an armistice line authorized the building of a
“wall,” parts of the fence reached beyond the authorized space and
separated Palestinian inhabitants from their farmland. 107The lawsuit’s
proceedings, which challenged the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) attempt to
extend its ownership of territory, concluded that a fence, infringing on less
Palestinian territory in the West Bank, could simultaneously protect the
Israelis and allow inhabitants access to their farmland.108 As the following
overview explains, the third step of the test enabled the court to reach this
decision.
The Israeli Court’s review of the first three steps upheld the IDF’s
original demarcation of the outlines for the fence.109 First, the Israeli High
105 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov’t of Israel 58(5) PD 807 [2004] (Isr.),
translated in 38 ISR. L. REP. 83 (2005).
106 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov’t of Israel 58(5) PD 807 [2004] (Isr.).
107 Jackson, supra note 88, at 3118.
108 Id.; HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov’t of Israel 58(5) PD 807 [2004]
(Isr.).
109 Jackson, supra note 88, at 3118.
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Court of Justice determined that Israeli protection against violent attacks
from the occupied territory was a legitimate purpose for building a fence.110
Next, the Israeli Court concluded that the government’s decision to place
the fence near the top of a mountain was a rational step toward that
objective.111 In the third step, Israel’s original placement of the fence
survived the minimal impairment analysis because any lower alternative
placement along the hill that provided a less severe infringement upon
Palestinian access to farmland would not provide as much security. In the
third step, the court explained that a “less restrictive means” referred only
to an alternative that equally advanced the law’s purpose while intruding
less on rights.”112
While the location of the fence passed the minimal impairment step of
the test, the Court’s strict application of proportionality “as such” produced
a different outcome that required Israelis to move the fence to a location
lower than the original placement that represented a lesser intrusion of
Palestinian human rights. More specifically, the Court held that the
marginal improvement to security and protection of Israeli civilians from
the original line to the lower location was far less than the marginal
intrusion on Palestinian human rights imposed by the higher location.113 A
test that stops after minimal impairment analysis had ruled that the fence’s
higher location should remain in place because the lower location would
not be as effective in protecting Israelis. However, when comparing the
marginal improvement of the higher with the lower location to the marginal
intrusion on Palestinians’ rights to access their farmland, the Court found
that a lower location should be the final placement.114 This is a prime
example of how the structured proportionality test maximizes the chances
of finding solutions that simultaneously promote public interests and
respect the rights of individuals or groups who are the object of the
government’s measures.
V. PROPORTIONALITY “AS SUCH” USING AIRBNB AND UBER
EXAMPLES: THE CASE FOR STRUCTURED PROPORTIONALITY
Ultimately, arbitrators’ decisions convey a message about the
figurative line between acceptable and unacceptable measures to legislators
and regulators who develop and enforce regulations and parties affected by
them. While the tailored regulations are not as effective as their broad-brush
alternatives, they are significantly less intrusive into users’ and providers’
rights. Arbitral tribunals that examine cases through the “as such” lens are
110
111

Id.
Id.; HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov’t of Israel 58(5) PD 807 [2004]

(Isr.).
112
113
114

Jackson, supra note 88, at 3118.
Id.
Id.
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less likely to uphold overbroad measures than those who use the less formal
approach to proportionality.
A. Uber and the “As Such” Approach
Onerous licensing requirements and de facto banishments of Uber
drastically mitigate the number of injuries to passengers and, consequently,
the number of claims to insurance companies for compensation. For this
reason, these measures pass the first two steps of the constitutionality
inquiry. The significant reduction of Uber-related problems decrease of
Uber drivers and trips produced measures that provide less restrictive
measures on investors’ rights. While background checks and tailored
insurance requirements will ameliorate Uber’s safety concerns, they will
likely not be as effective as onerous licensing requirements that would
significantly reduce the number of drivers and the number of safety related
incidents. For this reason, the licensing requirement will pass the first two
steps. The third step inquiry, however, would provide a different outcome.
The third step requires a direct comparison between the marginal
improvement of broad regulations that improve safety and uninsured claims
by minimizing overall usage of the application to the marginal intrusion on
those would be prevented from driving and passengers who could not use
the service.
Conversely, the marginal improvement of requisite inspections and
background checks (as opposed to none) are greater than the marginal
intrusion on drivers who must undergo said inspections and checks. While,
the blunt measures that minimize usage would not pass.step 3, the nuanced
regulations would be upheld. .
B. Airbnb and the “As Such” Approach
Fort Worth, as referenced above, has adopted traditional regulatory
requirements for Airbnb users that should be more effective at reducing
Airbnb-related problems than problem-specific regulations. In spite of the
fact that tailored regulations are the more balanced alternative, a
proportionality test that does not include the “as such” prong might not
identify this option and will uphold the broad regulations. As the graphic
below demonstrates, the structured proportionality test would likely
produce a different outcome. The marginal improvement in noise reduction,
inflated rent, and housing shortages from traditional bed and breakfast
regulations that would diminish the usage of Airbnb does not outweigh the
marginal intrusion on investors’ rights between minimizing overall usage
and implementing nuanced regulations. Therefore, the current Fort Worth
measure blunt measures would not pass the “as such” step.
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Airbnb
Step 1: Are requirements that Airbnb lessors use bed and
breakfast requirements effective at reducing noise
pollution and inflated rent problems?
Step 2: Are there less restrictive alternatives to stringent
Bed and Breakfast regulations and are other measures
that minimize usage equally effective at fixing such
problems [group them together]? AND
Step 3: Which is greater: the marginal improvement to
affordable housing shortages and noise concerns from
citywide licensing requirements, as compared to
regulations tailored to area requirements OR the
marginal intrusion on investors’ rights to citywide
licensing requirements addressing the problems by
minimizing usage?

Yes

No

Marginal
intrusion

The graphic above does not encapsulate the calculus of every
upcoming dispute. Rather, it demonstrates how the structured
proportionality test maximizes the probability that arbitrators will identify
and encourage more balanced alternatives that recognize the interests of
additional stakeholders. For example, in the San Francisco context, the
structured proportionality test would likely uphold the measures that are
tailored to ensure that hosts only post one listing. The marginal
improvement to affordable housing shortages of such regulations would be
greater than the marginal intrusion on homeowners who want to rent out
multiple homes on Airbnb
C. Benefits of Structured Proportionality: The Bridge
The “as such” analysis does not provide a framework solely for
arbitral tribunals to identify balanced regulations. The decisions of the
courts and tribunals are a bridge to the decision-making processes of
legislators, regulators, and investors. While the decisions of government
officials play a role in framing risk exposures in all foreign direct
investments, the disruption of digital economy projects elicits significant
involvement of host government regulators. From developing regulations
that accommodate new products, to working with incumbents to provide an
effective and equitable investment climate, legislative officials are primary
actors in the cross-border digital economy. For these reasons, the consistent
application of structured proportionality principles will provide a judicial
backstop to legislative decisions that encourage merit-based regulations.115
115

Jackson, supra note 88.
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However arbitral inquiries into the purpose and legality of the regulations
and the “as such” comparison step is much more than a judicial backstop:
they provide “opportunities for the legislature to reflect on and improve its
own legislative product.”116
The consistent application of the three steps in structured
proportionality provides an explicit model for legislators and other
government officials in their decision-making:
Legislators who understand that statutes will be evaluated under
proportionality standards if challenged as infringing on individual
constitutional rights will have reason to give attention to the
rationality of the means, to whether there are other means less likely
to intrude on rights, and to whether the gains to be achieved are
weightier and of such a character as to warrant intrusions on
protected freedoms.117

In addition to helping legislative officials understand the court or
tribunal’s rubric for decision-making, consistent usage of structured
proportionality helps investors assess and manage risks related to their
projects. More specifically, an investor entering an emerging market
country who understands a tribunal’s process for determining the legality of
regulations will be able to make many important decisions that impact all
stages of the investment. For example, scenario-planning is a fundamental
risk management strategy that companies use to manage country risk.
Those companies who plan for such risks identify the different ways in
which government decisions will affect their ability to implement their
business model. When such decision-makers are equipped with the tools to
understand the type and scope of regulations that are likely to be passed by
legislators and regulators, they can better prepare and develop a course of
action for responding to them. This process is an essential component of
succeeding in emerging markets.
D. Compromise in Cooling-off Period
Another example of the use of structured proportionality that helps
investors anticipate the legality of disputed regulations takes place in
cooling-off periods. Cooling-off periods are also known as a feature of the
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and ISDS.118 Parties seeking to initiate
arbitration proceedings are required to attempt to reach an amicable

116
Insisting on proper purpose and legal authority focuses attention on the central role of
legislatures in authorizing and limiting government conduct that affect investors’ rights.
117 Jackson, supra note 88, at 3146.
118 See Joachim Pohl, Kekeletso Mashigo & Alexis Nohen, Dispute Settlement
Provisions in International Investment Agreements: A Large Sample Survey, 7
TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 1, 17 (2012) (detailing cooling off period).
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settlement that would avoid the need for contentious proceedings.119 While
the number of days for a cooling-off period varies, all treaties require that
both parties enter mediation or some other form of consultation during
which they are encouraged to explore reasonable options for an amicable
settlement.120 After a good-faith effort has failed to produce an amicable
settlement, the claimant is authorized to file for arbitration.121 The
consistent application of structured proportionality in technology disputes
will draw a figurative line between those that are effective but fail to
respect investor rights and those that are sufficiently effective and
respectful of the infringed rights. If the parties identify this figurative line
and understand that arbitrators are likely to enforce it, they will have a
better understanding of the likely arbitration outcome and a clearer picture
of their negotiating positions and leverage. With a clear understanding of
these positions and the likelihood of success in contentious proceedings, the
parties will maximize the chances of reaching a settlement in the coolingoff period.122
CONCLUSION
The current trends of digital expansion and resurgent populist
sentiment foreshadow a significant number of disputes between inbound
investors and host governments. The outcomes of these disputes will not
only determine the fate of the parties in a given case but will also send a
clear message to similarly situated investors who are considering crossborder expansions and to legislators who regulate them. Polarized debates
about threats to sovereignty and the merits of low investment barriers
prevent stakeholders from considering the facts of each case before taking a
position. In many cases, there are regulatory options that respect
sovereignty and the investors’ rights. In the upcoming disputes, arbitral
panels must endorse such nuanced regulations to ensure that host countries
and investors enjoy the benefits of their investments. Structured
proportionality provides the solution to do just that. Unlike other versions
of proportionality, structured proportionality always compares the degree to
which the government’s measure impedes the investment’s success with the
degree to which it provides a nuanced approach that is practical. The
consistent use of this test will demarcate a figurative line between
acceptable and unacceptable regulations. With a clear understanding of the
difference between reasonable, tailored regulations and blunt measures that
119

Id.
Id.
121
Id.
122 The formal, sequenced implementation of structured proportionality helps investors
understand the figurative line between acceptable and unacceptable regulations. Because the
ambiguity of the less formal test provides the parties with less guidance about the
components of their balancing test, the parties will have less knowledge of their bargaining
position, and consequently, are less likely to settle.
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do not consider investors objectives, governments will be able to develop
balanced regulatory alternative that avoid the need for contentious
proceedings. In situations where conflicts arise, parties to disputes who
understand the figurative line will be more likely to reach a compromise.
Finally, the more balanced alternative will also help host governments
attract FDI and the benefits of technology transfer.
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